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1. INTRODUCTION
 
In his recently published The United States and 
Terrorism: An ironic Perspective (hereafter, UST), Ron 
Hirschbein examines the history of war—especially the use 
of terroristic carpet and/or mass destruction bombings of 
civilian populations—from the perspective of the many 
layers of irony which characterize the policies, propaganda, 
and hubris of United States’ engagement. As an optics, 
Hirschbein argues that irony offers a unique opportunity to 
I




underscore both the immensity of the violence and loss that 
is war, and the myriad ways in which war is rationalized, 
euphemized, eulogized, and elided in the interest of 
objectives often far less noble than the flag-waving rhetoric 
of its proponents.  “This is not the first book on terrorism,” 
he writes, “but it’s unique: it recounts recent American 
encounters with terrorism in an unsettling ironic light” 
(UST, p. 1). Appealing to philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, 
Hirschbein proposes a “narrative account of terrorism from 
World War II to the present,” but with a special focus on the 
“incongruities in the language that would be humorous if it 
weren’t tragic; and incongruous situations in which war 
planners provoke what they intend to prevent” (UST, p. 1). 
Hirschbein’s aim, in other words, is to explore the irony not 
only of waging war as a means to peace, but, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, might put it, the language games deployed to 
shield objectives ulterior to and often incongruous with the 
propaganda required to gain public support.  
 
No doubt, Hirschbein’s right about this much: irony abounds 
in these accounts. Indeed, given the sheer volume of 
scholarship devoted to comprehending the out-sized role of 
the United States in war and terror and, as Hirschbein rightly 
notes, the extent to which such accounts are themselves party 
to the ideological mission of defending the country from its 
critics, his claim to uniqueness is bound to be a tall order. 
Hence, it’s not necessarily dissuasive that The United States 
and Terrorism doesn’t quite live up to that promise; what is 
dissuasive is that he anchors uniqueness to the optics of 
irony-detection. This strategy, I suggest, sinks Hirschbein’s 
ship for at least five reasons. Some of these concern his 
apparent but unexamined assumption that he can advance his 
argument for a unique perspective by way of spelling out 
ironies implicit in the political rhetoric of war and terror 
(reason one); others concern philosophically suspect choices 
that an optics of irony-detection compel Hirschbein to make. 




The problem with The United States and Terrorism boils 
down, however, to this: the optics of irony-detection is 
ultimately too narrow in its scope to live up to the uniqueness 
Hirschbein promises; hence, his claim to original insight or 
depth beyond the scholarship to date is destined to fall flat.  
And worse: the work ultimately generates its own dark irony 
in that while Hirschbein argues that what characterizes the 
21st century is that we no longer care about truth in 
justifications for war, he does manifestly care—destining 
The United States and Terrorism to both the stillborn and, 
channeling Nietzsche more intimately than he intends, to 
nihilism. 
 
Reason One: Irony can only be shown; it can’t be 
explained—and still be ironic. In the effort to substantiate 
his claim to the “uniqueness” of the irony-detection strategy 
Hirschbein fails to consider that more traditional accounts—
those that take themselves to be offering a “straight” read of 
history—often radiate irony, unintentionally but 
unmistakably. The more ideologically nationalist, the more 
richly ironic—more so than any deliberate attempt to spell 
out their blind spots and incongruities. Hirschbein rightly 
describes the many and telling inconsistencies, even outright 
contradictions, between the words and deeds of war; but in 
the act of calling out the irony rife in the decision to atom-
bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki (UST, p. 30-2), his account 
actually has the effect of deflating its punch. It’s like having 
the punchline of a joke explained to you; it doesn’t feel funny 
anymore. So too having the irony of the U.S. bringing peace 
to the Pacific by terror-bombing 150 thousand people to 
death spelled out in virtue of its gratuity and/or its ulterior 
motives with respect to the Soviets; there’s loads of irony 
here, but the feeling of it is lost.  
 
Put differently: I’m not convinced that Hirschbein, or 
anyone, can explain irony; it must be felt; it’s an implicit and 




defining aspect of the ironic that it solicits emotional 
reaction. As Wittgenstein might put it, you can point, but you 
cannot say, and you have to care about the gaps and fissures 
that irony exposes—or it won’t feel like anything. 
Traditional historical accounts do a superb job of creating 
that affective charge precisely because they’re not trying to 
do so. That’s part of what’s so ironic—that they don’t see 
the irony in their attempt to justify the use of the atom bomb. 
Hirschbein’s attempt to explain irony has the opposite effect; 
irony-detection neutralizes its incongruous payload before it 
can be felt. Ironically, he explains irony away. 
 
Reason Two: Terrorizing consequences are not 
necessarily the result of terrorism. In the interest of 
making a persuasive case for the uniqueness of the optics of 
irony-detection, Hirschbein glosses over, distorts, conflates 
or simply ignores important philosophical differences 
between “terrorizing” and “terrorism.” He adopts an 
approach that, clearly consequentialist, treats all acts that 
have the terrorizing of noncombatants as a result as 
terrorism, regardless potentially important differences in 
histories, motives, objectives, or perpetrators. What makes 
all such acts candidates for “irony,” just is that human 
populations are terrorized. Regardless whether the causes 
find their origins in the state’s appeal to ethical principles 
like peace or justice, or the complex ideological, economic, 
and religious drivers of substate groups, the irony, for 
Hirschbein, lay in the fact of carnage whose excess defies 
justification. By glossing over differences of motive and 
perpetrator, Hirschbein can block the ideological strategy of 
defining terrorism solely in terms of substate groups like Al 
Qaida (UST, p. 4), and thereby make the nation state the 
primary—most ironically central—focus of his attention. 
No other entity can wield the power of the state and its 
military, therefore the state cannot be allowed exemption 
from critical evaluation in light of the consequences of its 




actions. Moreover, because the United States exists, at least 
in principle, as an instantiation of peace and justice, its acts 
of terror epitomize the incongruity of state power more than 
any other. As Hirschbein puts it: “[o]fficials and their 
supporters respond that it’s obscene to suggest moral 
equivalence between jihadists killing noncombatants and 
American forces inadvertently causing collateral damage. 
They insist that US policymakers and the jihadists inhabit 
radically different moral universes” (UST, p. 4).  
 
Hirschbein is no doubt right—US policymakers and jihadists 
do not necessarily inhabit radically different moral 
universes, and we certainly don’t want to let countries off the 
hook for their commission or complicity in acts of political 
violence simply because they’re countries and not 
ideologically identified organizations. “[W]hether by 
accident or design,” he writes, “American actions harm 
noncombatants” (UST, p. 4, p. 92). Absolutely—but while 
Hirschbein’s desire to include the country within the ambit 
of moral evaluation is praiseworthy, this doesn’t obviate the 
fact that there’s a morally significant difference, between 
“accident” and “design”; such a difference may in fact make 
the actions of immense military operations even more 
reprehensible—no matter what we call them. But there’s no 
way to justify that assessment—to get beyond the mere irony 
of consequences that outweigh any justification—without 
probing that difference. Feeling the irony embedded in the 
incongruous policies of, for example, the G.W. Bush 
administration’s preemptive strike doctrine, its absurd and 
slippery justification(s) for invading Iraq, and the fact of that 
country’s post-war U.S. sponsored instability is just the 
beginning of evaluation—not its zenith.  
 
“And what was “shock and awe” about?” continues 
Hirschbein. “Didn’t it send the signal message of terrorism? 
Be afraid. Be terribly afraid” (UST, p. 4). No doubt “shock 




and awe” was terrorizing, and by design, but it’s only on 
Hirschbein’s un-argued assumption that the motive and 
status of the perpetrator are largely irrelevant to the 
judgment that an act constitutes terrorism that we can 
conclude either that the “signal” purpose of “shock and awe” 
was to terrorize or that there were not other, potentially more 
“signal,” motives.  As Hirschbein’s own analysis suggests 
concerning access to ports, oil, and influence in the Middle 
East, there were other motives, most if not all of which make 
clear that “shock and awe” was simply a military means to a 
set of inchoate, but nonetheless geopolitical ends. Terror for 
its own sake was no more the point of shock and awe than 
were dead Japanese citizens the signal point of dropping the 
Atom bomb—even if both actions are morally condemnable 
on many other grounds.  
 
Motives do matter: the November 2015 Islamic State 
bombings in Paris clearly include political objectives, but the 
creation of a permanent state of terror is not, for them, 
merely a means to an end—it forms a crucial aspect of 
realizing and maintaining an Islamic Caliphate. If there’s 
irony to be appreciated here, it lay in recognizing that 
organizations like the Islamic State have plainly little use for 
the rationalizing rhetoric of the state to conceal its use of 
violence; ISIS deploys the appeal to terror at every level of 
its organizational mission—recruitment, disposition of duty, 
resource acquisition, suicide assignment, discipline, and 
weapons manufacture. While it’s certainly arguable that the 
state also utilizes various coercive means, economic and 
political, to insure its standing armies, its aims are hardly the 
creation of a permanent state of exploitable terror; that, after 
all, doesn’t get people out to go shopping. In short, acts of 
war are terrorizing, but if we think motives and objectives 
matter—and they do—acts of war are not terrorism, and this 
is not merely a difference of semantics.  
 




Reason Three: Shaming does not an argument make: 
Hirschbein reiterates his commitment to consequences as the 
primary (if not sole) criterion for determining whether an 
action counts as terrorism regularly throughout The United 
States and Terrorism. He clearly knows, however, that the 
consequentialist approach has its detractors. When he 
deadpans, for example, that “[c]ontroversies about 
semantics and ethics don’t matter to the dead” (UST, p. 92), 
he says what few would contest, but evades the point: they 
do matter to the living because motives and objectives are 
not merely semantic. Understanding them can encourage 
actions that prevent suffering and death. To point out what 
doesn’t matter to the dead isn’t an argument; it’s a sort of 
shaming, a tactic Hirschbein repeats in reference to the 
firebombing of Pyongyang during the Korean war: “[a]gain, 
whether these actions fit one of the many contested 
definitions of terrorism distracts from what is salient: the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of noncombatants” (UST, 
p. 104). How dare we suggest that defining terrorism in any 
other terms might be ethically defensible? How dare we 
search for clues, say, in the motives of the North Koreans, 
the Vietcong, the Taliban, the Islamic State in the effort to 
prevent the next episode of political violence?  
 
The problem with this approach is that not only is shaming a 
philosophically suspect tactic, it will fail on any reader astute 
enough to wonder whether consequences are the only criteria 
for determining what constitutes terrorism. While attempting 
to neutralize the controversy may help Hirschbein 
consolidate a specific rhetorical site for the irony that attends 
the consequences of policies and actions that produce 
suffering in the name of peace and justice, its actual effect is 
to highlight the contrived narrowness of the irony-detection 
strategy. In reminding us that “[s]urely noncombatant 
casualties were foreseen” in Iraq, Hirschbein obscures the 
difference between “foreseen” and “deliberate,” but this 




goes no ways at all to settle the morally significant 
controversy over whether “foreseen” carries the same moral 
load as “deliberate.” To be clear, my point here is not to 
adjudicate that debate; my point is that there is such a debate, 
that it matters, and that only on a narrowly utilitarian 
approach would we deny that. But such it seems is 
prerequisite for the success of the irony-detection strategy. 
 
Reason Four: “Terror” isn’t necessarily “terrorism,” 
and definitions matter. There are many contested views 
about how we should define terrorism, and Hirschbein 
makes a valuable point when, appealing to sociologist Lisa 
Stampnitsky, he argues that the use of this language has 
shifted over time (p. 132). But Hirschbein misunderstands 
Stampnitsky’s central claim when he remarks that “[a]s she 
notes, prior to the 1972 Munich massacre American 
authorities defined airline hijackers, kidnappers, and various 
bandits and rebels as criminals, not terrorists,” (UST, p. 
132). True—but this isn’t because the terrorizing actions of 
governments were defined by contrast as terrorism, and it’s 
not because “[t]hese felons of yesterday didn’t challenge the 
state’s monopoly” (UST, p. 132). The actions of 
governments weren’t explicitly defined as terrorism even if 
their consequences terrorized; hence Stampnitsky’s claim 
(true or false) has no real bearing on Hirschbein’s endeavor 
to reverse engineer history from the standpoint of the 
consequences, and it’s irrelevant whether the state 
constitutes a monopoly: the Munich actors were more than 
mere criminals; period.  
 
It’s doubly ironic, then, that Hirschbein unintentionally 
discloses the difference between post-Munich references to 
terrorism—defined in terms of the actions of substate 
groups—and the uses of terror by the state to ostensibly 
achieve peace and justice in war when he writes: 




Post-Munich discourse went to extremes to 
express the rage and humiliation of being 
upstaged by non-state actors, actors who 
proved the nation state could no longer 
protect its citizens. The official lexicon had 
an expression for violence taken to 
extremes—“terrorism.” During World War 
II, facing a “supreme emergency,” the Allies 
endorsed what I called “Just Terrorism 
Theory”: they believed they were justified, if 
not obligated, in taking extreme measures to 
defeat the Axis powers. Accordingly, they 
inflicted the worst imaginable violence” 
terror bombing designed to kill, destroy, and 
demoralize. Terrorism expert Brian Jenkins 
got it right: terrorism is theater. Terror 
bombing sent a message in the Asian and 
European theaters: ordinary citizens were 
exquisitely vulnerable to horror visited by 
alien powers. (UST, p. 133-4). 
 
No doubt, terror bombing did send this message—but 
creating a permanent state of terror was neither its only nor 
its primary purpose, however otherwise unjust we may find 
the actions of the state. Hirschbein implicitly concedes as 
much when he claims, “the Allies believed they were 
justified.” “Inflicting the worst imaginable violence” could 
never have been justified on the grounds that it was the worst 
imaginable even if the Allies’ arguments for terror bombing 
were poor—indeed, even if any argument for that magnitude 
of violence is indefensible.  Hirschbein’s “ironic” reading of 
history from its consequences conflates having an effect with 
intending that and only that effect. But the fact that ordinary 
citizens were “exquisitely vulnerable” doesn’t imply that 
they were targeted by the Allies because they were 
vulnerable. That case would be difficult to make—however 




otherwise misguided the Allies’ decisions, and however 
much we may describe the consequences as a kind of horror-
theater for the consumption of others.  
 
In effect, Hirschbein mistakes the zeal with which 
“terrorism” was appropriated to the post-Munich lexicon for 
its expropriation from pre-Munich discourse in order to 
validate his “Just Terrorism Theory” as—and deeply 
ironically—the right description of the intentions, motives, 
objectives of, for example, the Allies during World War II. I 
say “ironically” because while Hirschbein appeals to the 
magnitude of the consequences to justify his argument for 
irony-detection, it’s ultimately to the intentions of the agents 
responsible for terror bombing he must aver to justify their 
actions as “terrorism.”  The problem is then two-fold:  in the 
first place, “terrorism” didn’t need to be expropriated from 
anywhere. As Stampnitsky makes clear, the point of 
adopting “terrorism” was to distinguish, as Hirschbein 
points out, “venal, all too common perfidy”—mere crime—
from ideologically motivated well-planned actions whose 
aim is to create a permanent state of fear. In the second, it’s 
unlikely and unknowable whether the intentions of the Allies 
(or the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Johnson, or Bush 
administrations) were to create a state of fear; yet, we’re 
required to impute such intentions if terror bombing is to be 
terrorism as the “Just Terrorism Theory” requires. To the 
objection that terrorist organizations like Al Qaida, the 
Michigan Militia, the Bundy family, the Islamic State, the 
NRA, Earth First!, or the Ku Klux Klan also have objectives 
beyond creating a permanent state of fear—true, but 
irrelevant since it’s not their status as perpetrators of 
terrorism that’s in question here—except that in order to 
disqualify any or all from candidacy, we need a definition of 
terrorism that reaches well beyond a calculation of the 
magnitude of consequences. 
 




Reason Five: Cognitive insolence and the end of irony (?) 
In the fifth and final chapter of The United States and 
Terrorism, Hirschbein makes a case for the claim that 
“[t]here’s no need to avoid cognitive dissonance in a culture 
that promotes cognitive insolence”:  
 
truth isn’t merely ignored, it’s ridiculed. 
Bush and his advisors finally got it. They 
realized their audience could handle the truth 
because no one cares. When entertainment 
becomes the métier of discourse, it’s not 
merely a means to propagandize: 
entertainment becomes an end in itself…The 
Bush administration determined that 
Americans no longer inhabit a reality-based 
culture (UST, p. 177-8) 
 
He then goes on to profile the many (and often profoundly 
crass) ways in which the Iraq War has been transformed into 
entertainment for American consumers uninterested in 
distinguishing between wars and video games, news and 
movies. He walks us through the manipulation of the media, 
the censorship of anything that undermined the war’s 
entertainment value (images of carnage, recognition of Iraqi 
casualties), the use of patriotic slogans, music, torrential 
propaganda rained down through every media outlet as news 
(not only FOX), and the creation of heroic images, movies 
(American Sniper, for example), and fund-raising 
organization (Wounded Warrior, for instance). He reviews 
several well-established critiques of the war: the Bush 
Doctrine’s patent violation of international law, the uses of 
torture, the fact that Saddam Husain had no connection to the 
terrorist attacks of 9-11, the absence of weapons of mass 
destruction, the whole-cloth fabrication of a threat to 
national security, the Obama administration’s war-by-drone 
strikes. And he bewails a culture that’s more interested in the 




inane gruel of TV programming like Honey Boo Boo (or 
Duck Dynasty) than in any real engagement in issues of civic 
(much less global) import.  
 
But while Hirschbein appears to see this demoralizing 
insolence (and insularity) as the zenith of irony, as irony 
steam-rolled to its most deafening crescendo in the sheer 
endlessness of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (or the 
“new” Cold War with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the Syrian 
refugee crisis, terrorizing pathogens like Ebola and the Zika 
Virus, climate change…), I’d argue that if he’s right that no 
one cares then the current state of the culture is actually not 
irony’s zenith—but its inglorious and unremarkable death. 
Irony depends utterly on our caring about things like 
motives, intentions, and objectives because the 
consequences of war, or contagion, or tsunami, or starvation 
don’t look all that different from the point of view of the 
consequences alone. If we accept Hirschbein’s definition 
and judge the ironic in light of the immense suffering that 
results as a consequence of policies that, incongruously, 
appeal to peace and justice, then once we no longer care 
about the incongruity—once we’re no longer outraged by the 
consequences (or whether we’re even privy to them)—irony 
is simply vanquished. Forever. If the consequences of a war 
matter no more to us (so long as we’re not the ones dying) 
than the cliff-hanger episode at the end of this season’s The 
Walking Dead, there just is no incongruity between the 
policy of whatever president’s in power and sending another 
hundred special forces troops to Iraq or a few more 
“advisors” to Afghanistan—or an air strike on a Doctors 
Without Borders hospital in Kunduz, or Aleppo.  
 
The great irony of The United States and Terrorism is that 
its point is to get us to care.  Yet, in offering us an optics 
through which we can witness terror from only one 
perspective, namely, looking backwards from consequences 




cast as the deliberate attempt to create an enduring state of 
fear, Hirschbein unwittingly drives his reader to precisely 
the collapse of caring he decries in his final chapter. If the 
production of terror describes the essential character of the 
state’s response to conflict, the ultimate consequence isn’t 
even suffering; it’s nihilism. It’s the nihilist who amuses her 
or himself to death. Ironic too that the narrative Hirschbein 
provides up to this pseudo-crescendo is littered with 
incidents, decisions, blunders, policy junctures, all from the 
history of war—WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, 
Afghanistan—as if reacquainting ourselves with these facts 
will reignite our capacity to care; he must hope so. Yet, if his 
characterization of 21st century America’s cultural zeitgeist 
is correct, what could justify the expectation that The United 
States and Terrorism could steer us to another course? If 
Hirschbein’s right about the fundamental insight of G.W. 
Bush, et al., and we just don’t care about the justifications—
no matter how absurd—that get us into war so long as it’s 
entertaining, we’re truly doomed. After all, given our current 
trajectory through climate change, our next wars won’t be 
about high-minded principles like justice, but rather 
something far more mundane, existential, and resistant to 
cognitive insolence: clean water.  
 
The way back to caring about political violence: While I 
appreciate his effort to reinvigorate our caring about the 
consequences of political violence by getting us to see the 
ironic incongruities that pockmark our history as a country, 
the truth is that because irony cannot be known, but rather 
must be felt, Hirschbein’s project was crippled from the 
outset. There is, however, a silver lining: we can return to 
the drawing board and try again to hammer out workable 
definitions of terrorism. Indeed, if it’s the terrorism of the 
present we seek to understand and prevent, whether our 
prospective definitions apply to the past matters less than 
deciding that what counts is not merely a matter of 




semantics. That’s of course a decision to care, and 
Hirschbein could be right—perhaps we’ve gone too far. But 
I don’t think he believes that; after all, he wrote a book.  
 
So, in the spirit of returning to the drawing board, I’ll close 
by proposing three criteria that I think offer a very general, 
but practicable, framework for any discourse about modern 
day terrorism. There’s not much of irony here, but in the end 
I assume we’re not really after derisive laughter, but rather 
the more profane, but nonetheless hopeful desire to be 
emancipated from the absurd suffering death of the 
noncombatant:  
 
• First, because debates about what constitutes 
terrorism involve serious and sustained 
consideration about what motives define the 
terrorist, who all counts as having such 
motives, whether such motives are 
attributable to individuals, organizations, 
countries, or all three under different 
descriptions, they’re critical to an 
understanding of terrorism beyond—and 
before—its consequences. However 
contentious and messy, debate can generate 
caring, and it can inform just strategies for 
addressing political violence.  
 
• Second, nation states like the U.S. are not less 
morally culpable or condemnable if we 
determine that terror bombings as well as 
other military actions in Japan, Germany, 
Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq—
Panama, Grenada, Syria, Lybia, etc.—are not 
properly characterized as terrorism. The 
philosopher’s job is to find the most 
appropriate, comprehensive, truth-telling 




vocabulary to describe and explain the actors 
and the actions whose consequences are 
suffering and preventable death. High-
magnitude suffering may produce more irony 
in light of the incongruous policies that cause 
it, but magnitude is neither the only criteria 
for what counts as ironic, nor is it the sole 
arbiter of what counts as significant in moral 
evaluation. Hence, what matters most is not 
whether particular policies or decisions are 
incongruous with their putative goals; what 
matters is coming to understand the causes—
complex and messy—of terrorism, and 
responding in a fashion that makes future acts 
of political violence less likely. That this 
likely requires abandoning absurdities like 
“American exceptionalism” or “manifest 
destiny” is a tall order, but one not taller than 
confronting squarely the most likely culprit 
and beneficiary of contemporary terrorism: 
globalized corporate capitalism. 
 
• Third, it’s morally incumbent to make the 
effort—no matter how contentious—to 
define terrorism—whether this fits with the 
past or not. What we need is a definition 
that’s flexible enough to accommodate a 
wide and evolving range of actions which 
have noncombatant populations, nonhuman 
animal species, and ecosystems as their 
targets, but not so flexible or broad that 
disease vectors, tsunamis, earthquakes, 
drought, and tornadoes can count in virtue of 
their sheer devastation.  
 




In short, we can continue to track a course that is nihilism; 
but we manifestly cannot afford it. 
 
 
 
